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Abstract
This paper proposes the notion of ‘Privacy-Anomaly Detection’ and considers
the question of whether behavioural-based anomaly detection approaches can have
a privacy semantic interpretation and whether the detected anomalies can be related
to the conventional (formal) definitions of privacy semantics such as k-anonymity.
The idea is to learn user’s past querying behaviour in terms of privacy and then
identifying deviations from past behaviour in order to detect privacy violations.
Privacy attacks, violations of formal privacy definition, based on a sequence of
SQL queries (query correlations) are also considered in the paper and it is shown
that interactive querying settings are vulnerable to privacy attacks based on query
sequences. Investigation on whether these types of privacy attacks can potentially
manifest themselves as anomalies, specifically as privacy-anomalies was carried
out. It is shown that in this paper that behavioural-based anomaly detection ap-
proaches have the potential to detect privacy attacks based on query sequences
(violation of formal privacy definition) as privacy-anomalies.
1 Introduction
The recent past has witnessed an exponential increase in the volume of data being
collected by organizations. This has been enabled by the aggressive development of
computing technologies. Data is fuelling most of the revolutionary technologies. Tech-
























Data analytics aims to discover meaningful insights from the data that may lead to
improved decision-making. Data analytics offers a broad spectrum of benefits, for ex-
ample, it enables a contemporary organization to anticipate business opportunities as
well as enable the delivery of relevant products to its customers. In a nutshell, analytics
over a large volume of data has the potential to impact businesses and our society.
Data comes from multiple sources and may include sensitive personal data. On the
one hand, one cannot deny the importance and value of data, while on the other hand,
the usage, storage, and access to this data can raise privacy concerns. The recently en-
acted EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1] makes it more challenging
to use personal data for analytics. However, once the data is anonymized, it is consid-
ered to no longer be personal data [1, 2]. Achieving anonymization is non-trivial while
preserving the utility of data. Increasing the level of anonymization protects data but
reduces utility. Thus organizations must trade-off the need for more in-depth analytics
against the privacy of individual’s data. In essence, it is a long-standing open problem
to get high-quality analytics by querying the databases consisting of information about
individuals while preserving the privacy of those individuals.
Numerous incidents have been reported where privacy was compromised due to
poor anonymization of released data, for example, the famous case of Netflix [3],
AOL [4], de-anonymization of NYC taxi data [5], and the famous case of the Mas-
sachusetts Governor [6]. In [6], it was shown that by linking on shared attributes (zip-
code, birth date, and gender) in two datasets, Massachusetts Group Insurance Com-
mission’s released data (considered anonymous) and voter rolls, records belonging to
the Massachusetts Governor were identified. Researchers have devised formal privacy
definitions1 [7, 8, 9] when these definitions are followed then the anonymized data man-
ifests some formal guarantees. There are several privacy definitions to anonymize data,
including, k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, and differential privacy. The major-
ity of the syntactic privacy definitions were designed for a one-time release of data. In
contrast to these definitions, differential privacy is for interactively querying a database.
However, differential privacy has practical limitations as well; for instance, differential
privacy allows only a limited number of queries to be answered. Allowing an unlimited
number of queries results in higher noise; thus, the ability to observe correlations be-
tween attributes are lost, which is not desirable for richer analytics [10]. Approaches to
detect privacy violations, while allowing an unlimited number of queries while having
richer analytical utility are desirable.
Existing work in literature on detecting malicious access (security attacks) to Database
1Privacy definitions, in literature, are otherwise known as privacy models, privacy criteria, privacy met-
rics, privacy constraints as well as privacy principles.
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Management System (DBMS) have shown the effectiveness of behaviour-based anomaly
detection system to detect these security attacks. This work looks at to what extent
these kinds of techniques can be used to detect privacy attacks. This work considers
the research question that whether one can provide a privacy semantics for behavioural-
based approaches or relate the notion of privacy-anomaly detection to the conventional
definitions of privacy semantics? In order to answer the above-mentioned questions,
the notion of ‘Privacy-Anomaly Detection’(PAD) is introduced in this paper. PAD
learns privacy criteria from past interactions (audit logs) and uses this criteria to check
whether the current behaviour is different from past behaviour with respect to privacy.
The PAD architecture falls within an interactive query system setting for microdata
release.
We describe a naı̈ve instantiation of PAD using k-anonymity privacy criteria which
we refer to as (k-anonymity)-PAD. A study is carried out to investigate whether a
security-anomaly detection system, in particular, the n-gram approach presented in [11],
can detect these (k-anonymity)-PAD privacy-anomalies.
In this work, we also show that PAD-based interactive mechanisms are vulnerable
to privacy attacks based on SQL query sequences. We further investigate: whether
these types of privacy attacks based can potentially manifest themselves as anomalies
and whether one can interpret a security-anomaly detection system in such a way that
it can detect privacy attacks as privacy-anomalies. We present the result that privacy
attacks (like inferences) can be detected by applying security-anomaly detection system
over the logs of interactive querying mechanisms on the basis of a PAD interpretation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a design of a
privacy-anomaly detection system and an instantiation based on k-anonymity. Sec-
tion 3 investigates whether there is a correlation between privacy and security anoma-
lies. Section 4 considers a privacy attack based on query sequence on PAD. Section 5
presents an application of security-anomaly detection system to detect (unknown) pri-
vacy attacks as privacy-anomalies. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Privacy-Anomaly Detection (PAD) System
This section introduce the notion of privacy-anomaly detection and present a naı̈ve in-
stantiation of it based on k-anonymity. We argue that this naı̈ve instantiation constitutes
the basis for a more advanced form of a privacy-anomaly detection system, analogous
with k-anonymity which constitutes the basis for more sophisticated formal privacy
definitions. The reasons are as follows. Firstly, this is an exploratory study to con-
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age zipcode county gender salary
>55 989234 Cork Male 60K
>55 989234 Cork Male 92K
>55 989234 Cork Male 77K
>45 839523 Cork Male 50K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 60K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 63K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 85K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 70K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 60K
>50 839567 Cork Female 72K
>50 839567 Dublin Female 62K
>50 839567 Cork Female 92K
>50 839567 Dublin Female 77K
>50 839567 Cork Female 68K
Table 1: A fragment of relation temp table.
sider the question whether one can provide a privacy semantics for behavioural-based
anomaly detection approaches or relate the notion of privacy-anomaly detection to the
conventional definitions of privacy semantics? Therefore, using a well-understood pri-
vacy model like k-anonymity enables better understanding of the subject being ex-
plored and helps to avoid underlying complexities associated with other more complex
privacy definitions. Secondly, k-anonymity served as a foundation of many subsequent
formal privacy definitions, which is a good indicator of the applicability of this study
onto other privacy definitions.
2.1 A k-Anonymity based Privacy-profile
In the proposed model k-anonymity is used to specify a privacy limit [[k , q]], whereby
k individual must share the same quasi identifier q values in the result of a query. Intu-
itively, this means for that particular response, for a sufficient value of k, an adversary
can only narrow down to k individuals. In the case where an adversary has a sec-
ondary dataset with overlapping quasi-identifier values, then the query response can be
linked to k different individuals, therefore minimizing the risk of re-identification. In
the model the privacy-profile is defined as a set of privacy limits. In terms of privacy,
each privacy limit means that in a particular instance of a query response an adversary
won’t be able to distinguish an individual’s quasi-identifier values from k individuals






Table 2: A relation TR1 resulting from the query SELECT age, zipcode FROM
temp table WHERE gender = ‘Male’;.
Consider a relation temp table, as shown in Table 1, having several attributes in-
cluding a sensitive attribute salary, and quasi-identifiers age, gender, zipcode, and
county. For ease of exposition we assume the values for attribute age are aggregated
into age ranges, for instance, all the values for attribute age above 55 are represented
as >55. Given a mined privacy limit [[3, {age, zipcode}]], in privacy-profile, then
the response to the analyst query SELECT age, zipcode FROM temp table WHERE
gender = ‘Male’ AND county = ‘Cork’ AND age > 55; as shown in Table 2 is
not anomalous since the value of k for the the quasi-identifiers {age, zipcode} in the
response is greater than 3.
2.1.1 Mining k-anonymity based Profiles for PAD
The privacy-anomaly detection consists of two phases, similar to traditional anomaly
detection approaches, that are, learning phase and a detection phase. The instances
of the privacy model are mined from audit logs in order to generate privacy-profiles.
We refer to a privacy-profile that is mined from past logs in the learning phase as a
normative privacy-profile. The idea is to learn the k values for sets of quasi-identifier(s)
by mining past audit logs and interpret those mined ‘privacy limits’ as ‘normal’.
Given an audit log L∗, consisting of query responses, Pri(L∗) gives a privacy-profile
consisting of privacy limits mined from log L∗, where q ∈ QI represent a set of quasi-
identifier. A normative privacy-profile is generated from an anomaly-free past log
L∗norm and is denoted by Pri(L
∗
norm) = { [[k1, q1]], [[k2, q2]], . . . , [[km, qm]] }. For exam-
ple, consider the relation TR2 shown in Table 3, the mined value of k for the set of
quasi-identifiers {age, zipcode, county} is 4, that is, [[4, {age, zipcode, county}]] ∈
Pri(L∗norm). In essence we are constructing privacy limit (L
∗, q) which returns k as a
limit to the privacy in the table for a given q. The normative privacy-profile is ef-
fectively a set of these privacy limits mined against the logs for a given set of quasi-
identifiers. Intuitively, the tuples in the normative privacy-profile shows to what extent
one narrows down to individuals records in normative settings.
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age zipcode county salary
>55 839523 Cork 60K
>55 839523 Cork 92K
>55 839523 Cork 77K
>45 839523 Cork 50K
>35 839777 Dublin 60K
>35 839777 Dublin 63K
>35 839777 Dublin 85K
>35 839777 Dublin 70K
>35 839777 Dublin 60K
Table 3: A relation TR2 resulting from the query SELECT age, zipcode, county
FROM temp table WHERE gender = ‘male’;.
2.1.2 Detecting Privacy-anomalies
The detection phase, in terms of privacy, checks if an adversary is able to narrow down
to fewer than k individuals for a given set of quasi-identifiers in the normative pro-
file. In the instance, where the adversary is able to narrow down to fewer than spec-
ified k individuals for a given set of quasi-identifier then this instance is labelled as a
privacy-anomaly and poses higher risk of re-identification relative to normal. During
the detection phase, the run-time profile Pri(L∗run) constructed given a run-time log L
∗
run.
Pri(L∗run) is the constructed run-time profile. Given privacy limits [[ki, qi]] and [[k j, q j]]
then [[ki, qi]] subsumes [[k j, q j]] (denoted [[ki, qi]]  [[k j, q j]]) if imposing privacy limit
[[k j, q j]] instead of [[ki, qi]] leads to no additional loss of privacy. Formally,
[[ki, qi]]  [[k j, q j]] ≡ qi ⊆ q j ∧ k j ≥ ki
In the case where [[ki, qi]] ∈ Pri(L∗norm) and [[k j, q j]] ∈ Pri(L
∗
run) then [[ki, qi]] 
[[k j, q j]] means that [[k j, q j]] can be safely replaced by [[ki, qi]] without any loss of pri-
vacy. If a privacy limit subsumes another intuitively it means if the subsumed privacy
limit is replaced by the one that subsumes it then there is no loss of privacy.
Consider the response of a query at run-time shown in Table 4, and that there exists
a privacy limit [[3, {age, zipcode}]] in Pri(L∗norm). The mined value k of the set of quasi-
identifier {age, zipcode} is greater than 3 therefore this privacy limit [[5, {age, zipcode}]]
in Pri(L∗run) is considered to be subsumed by the privacy limit [[3, {age, zipcode}]] in
Pri(L∗norm). In terms of privacy, it means given that this instance of query response an









Table 4: A relation TR3 resulting from the query SELECT age, zipcode FROM
temp table WHERE gender = ‘female’;.
3 Security-anomaly Detection System Detecting Privacy-
anomalies
This section explores whether privacy-anomalies (as identified by the model in Sec-
tion 2.1.1) are also identified as security-anomalies by a security-anomaly detection
system in [11]). The security-anomaly detection system in [11] relies on n-grams to
construct profiles of querying behaviours using audit logs of SQL queries. The system
in [11] effectively detects malicious accesses by insider to a database management sys-
tem. We consider a variation of the hospital dataset, a fragment of the dataset is shown
in Table 5. Logs were generated for construction of a normative profile and another
for the construction of a run-time profile. The training logs (anomaly-free) for the n-
gram based approach are denoted by Lhospnorm, while the anomalous run-time logs for the
hospital datasets are denoted by Lhosprun . The next section studies whether a security-
anomaly detection system detects privacy-anomalies identified by the privacy-anomaly
detection system for these dataset.
To construct normative and run-time profiles using the n-gram model, selection of
an appropriate value of the size of n-gram was desirable for the hospital dataset. To
select an appropriate size of an n-gram in this scenario, test logs Lhosptest1 and L
hosp
test2 were
generated in a safe environment (anomaly-free). N-gram profiles were constructed with
varying n-gram size, that are, ngram(Lhosptest1 , n) and ngram(L
hosp
test2 , n), and generated pro-
files were compared. Figure 1 depicts the number of n-gram mismatches arising when
comparing the normal test ngram(Lhosptest1 , n) and ngram(L
hosp
test2 , n), for different values of
n. From the experiments, the n-gram of the size of 4 (n = 4) was considered optimal as
it resulted in an acceptable number of mismatches.
Once the value of n was decided upon, the normative and run-time profiles were
constructed for the experiments. Given the training logs Lhospnorm and L
hosp
run n-gram profiles
were constructed such that ngram(Lhospnorm, 4) and ngram(L
hosp
run , 4), and subsequently the
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Figure 1: The figure shows the number of mismatches between ngram(Lhosptest1 , n) and
ngram(Lhosptest2 , n) for different values of n.
normative and runtime profiles were compared.
The same queries in logs Lhospnorm and L
hosp
run were executed in the presence of the
privacy-anomaly detection system (described in Section 2) resulting in logs of query
responses Lhosp∗norm and L
hosp∗
run . Subsequently, a normative privacy-profile Pri(L
hosp∗
norm ) and
a run-time Pri(Lhosp∗run ) profiles were constructed and compared.
The attribute patient ID and e-mail ID were considered as a unique identi-
fier, the attribute diagnosis was considered as a sensitive attribute while the rest
of the attributes including first name, last name, status, dob, gender, city,
and marital status were considered as quasi-identifiers. For the experimentation,
two categories of privacy-anomalies were injected as described in Table 6. Using this
anomaly-containing run-time log, from 15 privacy-anomalies 13 were detected by the
n-gram based security-anomaly detection system proposed in [11] and the privacy-
anomaly detection system proposed in this paper.
3.1 Detected Privacy-anomalies
The n-gram based security-anomaly detection system detected all those privacy-anomalies
that were generated by injecting one more attribute into the relation. The privacy-
anomalies injected by adding one more attribute were identified as privacy-anomalies
by both systems. The reason that they were identified was because there were no n-
gram that contained a reference to new attribute in its query abstraction.
One of the detected privacy-anomalies corresponds to the query shown below.
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dob city gender diagnoses country ...
1981 Dublin Male Flu Ireland ...
1981 Dublin Male Flu Ireland ...
1981 Dublin Male Diarrhoea Germany ...
1920 Cork Male HeartDisease Ireland ...
1981 Galway Female Acne Ireland ...
1984 Galway Male Flu Spain ...
1984 Galway Male Diabetes Ireland ...
1984 Galway Male Hypertension Ireland ...
1984 Galway Male Leg Fracture France ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
1981 Dublin Male Flu Germany ...





Addition of one or more attributes to the base relation
shown in Table 5. For instance, a new attribute,
like country, was inserted in the relation and queries
were made to retrieve this attribute values.
5
Update or Deletion of records from relation
shown in Table 5 10
Table 6: Description of Privacy-anomalies injected.
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dob city diagnoses
1920 Cork Heart Disease
Table 7: Response to a undetected privacy-anomalous query.
SELECT diagnoses, dob, city, country
FROM hospitalDB
WHERE dob = ‘1981’
AND city = ‘Dublin’;
The normative privacy-profile contains no privacy limit reference to the new (or
combination of new) attribute.
3.2 Undetected Privacy-anomalies
A privacy-anomaly undetected by the n-gram based approach but detected by the pri-
vacy model is:
SELECT dob, city, diagnoses
FROM hospitalDB
WHERE dob = ‘1920’
AND city = ‘Cork’ ;
The query returns a relation with one record as shown in Table 7. It is identified as
a privacy-anomaly by the privacy model for the reason being that the specified value of
k for the specified set of quasi-identifier meant that an adversary was able to single out
an individual. This anomaly is undetected by n-gram based security-anomaly detection
approach because there was an n-gram in normative profile contained a reference to
this query abstraction.
3.3 Identifying Appropriate Privacy Limits
In order to find the optimal values of k, in the mining process, in theory, all the combi-
nations of quasi-identifiers need to be considered. This, in essence, is a combinatorial
explosion, especially in the case of a large number of quasi-identifiers. Additionally,
one may discover either very large or very small values of k in practice for certain com-
binations of quasi-identifiers. Therefore, in order to discover reasonable values of k,
one may define a range while mining the values of k such that the values falling within
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the range and their corresponding combinations of quasi-identifiers are considered for
privacy-profiles.
4 Privacy Attacks based on Query Sequences
This section demonstrates a privacy attack whereby an adversary discovers information
about an individual while the privacy-anomaly detection system is in place. Consider
the relation shown in Table 8.




Mark Single New York [30 - 40] 112k
James Single New York [30 - 40] 34k
John Single New York [30 - 40] 56k
Henry Single New York [30 - 40] 78k
Imran Single New York [30 - 40] 91k
David Married London [30 - 40] 112k
Alice Married London [30 - 40] 30k
Bob Married London [30 - 40] 45k
Aron Married London [30 - 40] 115k
Harry Married London [30 - 40] 180k
Jordan Separated Cork >40 65k
Ryan Separated Cork >40 100k
Bentley Separated Cork >40 80k
Simon Married Rennes >40 150k
Table 8: Relation updated table smp.
Q1
SELECT Salary
FROM updated table smp
WHERE city = ‘Rennes’;
Q2
SELECT Salary
FROM updated table smp;
Q3
SELECT MaritalStatus, Salary, Age
FROM updated table smp
WHERE City= ‘New York’ AND city =‘London’ AND city = ‘Cork’;
Table 9: Sequence of queries executed over the relation updated table smp shown
in Table 8.
Suppose the sequence of queries Q1, Q2 and Q3, shown in Table 9, are executed
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over the relation updated table smp shown in Table 8.
Query Q1 is labelled as an privacy-anomaly (and the query response is suppressed)
because the threshold is not satisfied as k-anonymity and DRSQL is not satisfied by
the query Q1. Whereas query Q2 passes the threshold and the response to the query
is shown in Table 10 that results in 14 records, that is, the value of attribute Salary,
being returned. Query Q3 also passes the privacy criteria and returns 13 records, as
shown in Table 11. The adversary, knowing that Simon’s record is in the table (as
background/external knowledge) and that Simon lives in Rennes, reveals that last re-
maining entry blocked by the query mechanism is of ‘Simon’ and the corresponding
salary attribute value is 150k.
In particular, the described attack is a form of a differencing attack [12]. Dif-
ferencing attacks have been seen previously on aggregates. This demonstrates that
k-anonymity in interactive settings is also susceptible to these differencing attacks. For
the purpose of demonstration, the example of a differencing attack is kept simple; how-
ever, real world differencing attacks can take more sophisticated forms, where the ad-
versary can make multiple queries to narrow down the aggregate data until the subject’s















Table 10: Records returned in the response to query Q2.
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MaritalStatus City Age Salary (sensitive attribute)
Single New York [30 - 40] 112k
Single New York [30 - 40] 34k
Single New York [30 - 40] 56k
Single New York [30 - 40] 78k
Single New York [30 - 40] 91k
Married London [30 - 40] 112k
Married London [30 - 40] 30k
Married London [30 - 40] 45k
Married London [30 - 40] 115k
Married London [30 - 40] 180k
Separated Cork >40 65k
Separated Cork >40 100k
Separated Cork >40 80k
Table 11: Records returned in response of query Q3.
5 Applying Security-anomaly Detection to Detect Un-
known Privacy Attacks
In general, interactive query mechanisms are susceptible to the attacks described in
the previous section, and as a consequence there is little privacy-preserving interactive
query mechanisms (specifically for microdata release) in the existing literature. The
existing differentially private interactive mechanisms allow a limited number of inter-
active queries for aggregate data. Restricting the number of queries is a significant
barrier for an analyst in achieving the true potential for data analytics. Privacy attacks,
similar to the one presented in the previous section, are violations of formal privacy
definitions like k-anonymity.
Another aspect of these privacy attacks is that the querying pattern to infer informa-
tion about the subject(s) is unknown, therefore, we refer to them as unknown privacy
attacks. Unknown privacy attacks lead to inferring information about the subject(s).
An adversary can articulate the queries in different ways to reveal information about a
subject(s). In this work, inference implies privacy attacks, that is, the adversary infers
information about the subject(s) while a formal privacy definition is in place result-
ing in a violation of formal privacy definition. Additionally, these privacy attacks are
based on query correlation, that is, an individual query is safe in terms of privacy but
when considered as sequence they result in the violation of formal privacy definition.
This section presents an investigation into whether the inferences can be detected as
anomalies.
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We present a novel perspective on the detection of privacy attacks by proposing
an interpretation of the behavioural-based detection approach. There are a number of
behavioural-based anomaly detection detection approaches that can be explored in this
context [11, 13, 14, 15]. We investigate the application of n-gram approach, proposed
approach in [11], to detect unknown privacy attacks as anomalies in the next section.
5.1 Detecting Privacy Attacks as Privacy-Anomalies
A behavioural-based approach to detect inferences as anomalies is described in this sec-
tion where the n-gram based approach is applied to the audit logs of the (k-anonymity)-
PAD system. The idea is to model querying behaviours in the presence of a privacy-
preserving interactive query mechanism and compare the normative querying behaviour
with the run-time querying behaviour to detect deviations.
For the SQL query abstraction, the specialization of the abstraction, as discussed in
[11], is employed. The SQL query abstraction that is a tuple representation of an SQL
query and consists of query features like relation name, attribute names, the amount of
returned data or any statistics on the returned data.
An abstraction of an SQL query Qi is denoted as Abs(Qi). The adopted query ab-
straction technique has also been studied in [16]. The query abstraction technique re-
places the constant values in a query Qi with place-holders (literal ‘VAR VAL’), and is
denoted as Abs(Qi). Abs(L) is defined as the mapping of Abs(Qi) over the elements Qi
of L. The reason to chose this query abstraction is that it gives us a reasonable level of
precision in capturing the querying behaviour of user. A more fine grained abstraction
would require some symbolic evaluation of the queries which was beyond the scope of
this work. Examples of the employed SQL query abstraction technique are shown in
Table 12.
The n-gram profiles are generated in the same manner as discussed in [11] that is
given a safe audit log of SQL query Lppnorm and a run-time log L
pp
run then the constructed
normative profile and run-time profile are βnorm = ngram(Abs(L
pp
norm), n) and βrun =
ngram(Abs(Lpprun), n). The mismatches are given by S missβrun−βnorm = βrun - βnorm.
In order to evaluate the detection of privacy attacks by applying the n-gram based
approach to the logs of interactive querying mechanism, a synthetic query generator
was designed that had defined a set of SQL query templates. The underlying database
was populated with a fragment version of well-known Census (Adult) dataset [17].
Query templates were designed to be executed on the Census dataset. The queries
were count queries mimicking a data analytics scenario. For example, the count queries
were for the form: how many subjects are Female, how many subjects have a Bachelors
14




WHERE id = 2
SELECT city
FROM bankDatabase




WHERE id = 9
SELECT city
FROM bankDatabase




WHERE id = 3
SELECT city
FROM bankDatabase








WHERE id = VAR VAL AND
Name = VAR VAL
Table 12: Examples of deployed SQL abstractions.
degree, so on and so forth. For the experimentation, a safe log Lppnorm was generated for
the construction of normative profile using the synthetic data generator.
In order to construct privacy attacks, five unique records were inserted into the
database that leads to inferences, where unique implies that one of the attribute or
combination of the attributes existed only once in the entire database. For example, a
record was inserted with occupation as post-doc, that is, in the underlying database
there was only one record where the value for occupation was post-doc. Another
record was inserted where the value for native-country was set to Malaysia, that
is, there was only one record where the native-country was Malaysia. Table 13
shows the make-up of the inserted records to enable privacy attacks.
# Description of Unique Record
1 Attribute occupation with value as post-doc
2 Attribute native-country with value as Malaysia
3 Attribute native-country with value as Spain and Attribute age as 33
4
Attribute native-country with value as Singapore
and Attribute age as 32
5
Attribute native-country with value as Singapore
and Attribute occupation as Academics
Table 13: Inserted unique records in the database to enable privacy attacks.
Queries were made to infer the associated salaries for these five unique records.
Table 14 shows the number of queries made to reveal the salary for the records shown
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in Table 13. These malicious query sequences were made part of the other logs Lpprun for
the construction for the run-time profile.






Table 14: Length of the query sequences to reveal salaries.
A normative profile βnorm and a run-time profile βrun were constructed using L
pp
norm
and Lpprun, respectively and compared. The size of the n-gram was kept at 4 for the
generation of profiles. The sequence of queries made to infer injected unique records
was labelled as anomalies the detection phase by the n-gram approach. The Table 15
shows the number of mismatches for each privacy attack.






Table 15: Detection of privacy attacks as privacy-anomalies: the table shows the num-
ber of mismatches that resulted from each of the 5 privacy attacks with the n-gram of
size 4.
The query sequences resulting in inferences were detected as privacy-anomalies,
which is a indication of potential effectiveness of n-gram based approach to detect
inference and unknown privacy attacks as privacy-anomalies.
6 Conclusions
While existing behavioural-based anomaly detection systems considered anomalies
arising from anomalous queries of users, this paper explores anomalies characterised
in terms of formal definitions of privacy. This work studies privacy semantic notion
of behavioural-based anomaly detection systems. The notion of privacy-anomaly de-
tection (PAD) introduced in this work enables one to learn a privacy model from the
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past log of interaction with the DBMS and detects deviations as privacy-anomalies. A
naı̈ve instantiations of PAD was presented based on k-anonymity (k-anonymity, DR)-
PAD. A study was carried out to examine whether the privacy violations based on a
single query detected the privacy-anomaly detection system are also detected by n-
gram security-anomaly detection system as anomalies. Results showed a number of
single query based privacy violations that had no reference n-gram in normative pro-
files were labelled as anomalies by n-gram based anomaly detection system. This work
also considered privacy attacks that were violations of formal privacy definitions and
were based on query correlation where a single query is not privacy-anomalous but a
sequence of queries results in a violation of formal privacy definition. Results showed
that behavioural-based security anomaly detection system (constructed using n-grams)
in [11] detected these privacy attacks as privacy-anomalies. This led to a discovery of
another aspect of the n-gram based approach whereby when it is applied on the logs
generated by interactive query settings with the presence of formal privacy definition,
it has the potential to detect privacy attacks based on query correlation as privacy-
anomalies.
Privacy attacks can manifest itself in a variety of unexpected ways, the results sug-
gest that therefore a silver bullet for anonymization may not be a way forward rather
utilise defence in depth from privacy perspective. One such privacy control is the pro-
posed privacy anomaly detection system. As a topic of future work, we plan to explore
how to compose and compare multiple privacy definitions using multi-criteria decision-
making method found in fuzzy logic [18, 19], in particular, known as triangular-norms
(t-norms).
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